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On the Quantum Mechanical Wave Function
as a Link Between Cognition and the




A straightforward explanation of fundamental tenets of quantum
mechanics concerning the wave function results in the thesis that the quantum
mechanical wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical
world.  The reticence on the part of physicists to adopt this thesis is discussed.
A comparison is made to the behaviorists' consideration of mind, and the
historical roots of how the problem concerning the quantum mechanical wave
function arose are discussed.  The basis for an empirical demonstration that the
wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world is
provided through developing an experiment using methodology from
psychology and physics.  Based on research in psychology and physics that
relied on this methodology, it is likely that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's
theoretical result that mutually exclusive wave functions can simultaneously
apply to the same concrete physical circumstances can be implemented on an
empirical level.
TEXT
It has been argued that the quantum mechanical wave function is a link
between cognition and the physical world (Snyder, 1986, 1989, 1990).  It is
difficult to believe that the wave function in quantum mechanics could be such a
link.  But the use of experimental results from psychology provides an avenue
to demonstrate that this thesis is correct.  In the process, it is shown that the
split that occurred between psychology and the physical sciences after the
establishment of psychology as an independent discipline contributed to the
delay in acknowledging this thesis.
It is the quantum mechanical wave function that gave rise to Einstein's
comment (1949/1969) considering the possibility, which he found untenable,
of "telepathically" (p. 85) changing the physical world in a gedankenexperiment
that he proposed with Podolsky and Rosen (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen,
1935).  Physicists have, in general, not accepted that the quantum mechanical
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though this thesis is the result of a straightforward explanation of the quantum
mechanical wave function.  Instead, they have opted either for a more
complicated explanation that agrees with the predictions of quantum mechanics,
involving hidden variables that would restore a classical-like structure to the
physical world, or they have opted to accept the validity of quantum mechanical
prediction while leaving out any view regarding the ontological implications of
quantum mechanics.1  It should be noted that there is no such reticence on the
part of most physicists to accept the realistic view of the world implied by
Newtonian mechanics.  As Einstein (1949/1969) wrote in his
"Autobiographical Notes":
Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is
thought independently of its being observed.  In this sense one
speaks of "physical reality."  In pre-quantum physics there was
no doubt as to how this was to be understood.  In Newton's
theory reality was determined by a material point in space and
time [functioning in a deterministic manner independent of
cognition]; in Maxwell's theory, by the field in space and time.
(pp. 81, 83)
Yet the thesis that the quantum mechanical wave function links
cognition and the physical world is based essentially on the generally accepted
view of quantum mechanics today by physicists.  Two features of the quantum
mechanical wave function that lead to this thesis and which are generally
accepted by physicists are:
1) the wave function is the basis for probabilistic predictions
concerning the physical existent described by the wave
function (originally proposed by Born [1926/1983]), and
2) the in general change of the wave function immediately
throughout space upon the observation of a quantity of the
existent described by the wave function.
                                    
1 Mermin (1985) put the matter this way:
Contemporary physicists come in two varieties.  Type 1 physicists are bothered by
EPR [the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedankenexperiment] and Bell's theorem [an
elucidation of this gedankenexperiment].  Type 2 (the majority) are not, but one has
to distinguish two subvarieties.  Type 2a physicists explain why they are not
bothered.  Their explanations tend either to miss the point entirely...or to contain
physical assertions that can be shown to be false [i.e., they incorporate some form of
hidden variables].  Type 2b are not bothered and refuse to explain why [even though
they accept the validity of quantum mechanical prediction]. (p. 41)
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To these features should be added the point that in quantum mechanics the wave
function associated with a physical existent is the basis for whatever can be
known concerning that physical existent (Liboff, 1992).2
These particular features are noted because they form the conceptual
foundation for the Schrdinger cat gedankenexperiment, a thought experiment
that provides an unusual result from a classical standpoint and which provides
the basis for the suggested role of the wave function as a link between cognition
and the physical world.  The result of the Schrdinger cat gedankenexperiment,
nonetheless, is interpreted by most physicists as not indicating that the wave
function is a link between cognition and the physical world.
The discussion of this gedankenexperiment by a contemporary
physicist, Shimony, who is also a philosopher of science will demonstrate the
way in which physicists generally consider the nature of quantum mechanical
wave function.  Then Einstein's view on the issue will be presented.  The
application of experimental methodology and results from psychology in an
investigation concerning spin angular momentum will provide additional
support for the thesis that the quantum mechanical wave function (perhaps more
accurately, the wave described by the wave function) is in part cognitive as well
as physical.  Finally, how physicists have not seen that psychological
phenomena are part and parcel of the quantum mechanical wave function is
explored.
THE SCHRDINGER CAT GEDANKENEXPERIMENT
Schrdinger (1935/1983) presented his cat gedankenexperiment in a
paper that was written in response to the paper noted above by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen (1935).  He wrote:
A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following
                                    
2 Another interesting feature is that an arbitrary phase factor, eia where   is any real number,
can be associated with a quantum mechanical wave function that does not change the
probabilities concerning the results of measurement events on the physical existent associated
with this wave function.  Liboff (1992) wrote:
A wavefunction is determined only to within a constant phase factor of the form eia.
Although associated with all wavefunctions, this arbitrary quality has no effect upon
any physical results. (p. 93)
(This arbitrary phase factor is not a phase factor such as that is a component wave function of
a composite wave function.  Rather it applies to the entire wave function, including space and
time components.)  Thus, the particular wave function associated with the physical existent is
not unique.  Indeed, there are an infinite number of particular wave functions, each having a
different arbitrary phase factor, that can be associated with a physical existent.
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diabolical device (which must be secured against direct
interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of
radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of
one hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal
probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube
discharges and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters
a small flask of hydrocyanic acid.  If one has left this entire
system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives
if meanwhile no atom has decayed.  The first atomic decay
would have poisoned it.  The Y-function of the entire system
would express this by having in it the living and the dead cat
(pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts.
It is typical of these cases [of which the foregoing example
is one] that an indeterminancy originally restricted to the atomic
domain becomes transformed into macroscopic indeterminancy,
which can then be resolved by direct observation. (p. 157)
Shimony (1988) presented his abbreviated version of Schrdinger's
gedankenexperiment as follows:
A photon impinges on a half-silvered mirror.  The photon has a
probability of one-half of passing through the mirror and a
probability of one-half of being reflected. If the photon passes
through the mirror, it is detected, and the detection actuates a
device that breaks a bottle of cyanide, which in turn kills a cat in
a box.  It cannot be determined whether the cat is dead or alive
until the box is opened. (p. 52)
Then Shimony wrote concerning the gedankenexperiment:
There would be nothing paradoxical in this state of affairs if the
passage of the photon through the mirror were objectively
definite but merely unknown prior to observation.  The passage
of the photon is, however, objectively indefinite, and so is the
aliveness of the cat.  In other words, the cat is suspended
between life and death until it is observed.  The conclusion is
paradoxical, but at least it concerns only the results of a thought
experiment. (p. 52)
It should be noted that Shimony incorrectly noted the
gedankenexperiment he presented was indeed the Schrdinger cat
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gedankenexperiment.  It is not, as Schrdinger relied on radioactive decay as
his quantum mechanical phenomenon instead of the passage of a light photon
through a mirror.
The two features of the quantum mechanical wave function noted earlier
can be seen readily in the cat gedankenexperiment.  Consider Shimony's
version.  The wave function that describes the photon in Shimony's version
yields a probabilistic prediction concerning its passage through the mirror.
Upon observation of the cat, which serves as the macroscopic measuring
instrument, the wave function describing the photon changes to one that allows
that the photon went through the mirror or one that allows that the photon did
not go through the mirror and was reflected.  Note that Shimony does not
specify how close the observer needs to be to the cat.  The observer can, in
principle, be at any distance from the cat, even across the universe, so long as
the observer makes an observation regarding whether the cat is alive.  (Indeed,
the observer does not even have to observe the cat directly but can rely on
another observer who has observed the cat.)
How does Shimony's version of the Schrdinger gedankenexperiment
reflect the view of most physicists that the wave function is not a link between
cognition and the physical world, in this case between the observer's perception
and the cat?  And how does the gedankenexperiment show that the nature of the
wave function as suggested here is warranted?
It is a link because of the two features of the quantum mechanical wave
function cited earlier, the first being that there is nothing in quantum mechanics
other than the probabilistic predictions concerning the physical world,
predictions that have been supported by empirical test.  The second feature is
that these probabilities in general change immediately throughout space upon
observation of a quantity of the physical existent described by the wave
function that gives rise to the probabilistic predictions.
In a related vein, Shimony did not explicitly discuss the role and
significance of the person as observer in the measurement process in quantum
mechanics.  Shimony, like many physicists, used the term observation
ambiguously.  Changing the latter quote from Shimony's paper to indicate that
the concern specifically is with a person making the observation does not lessen
the statement's validity:
There would be nothing paradoxical in this state of affairs
[concerning whether or not the cat is alive or dead before it is
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observed] if the passage of the photon through the mirror were
objectively definite but merely unknown prior to observation [by
a person].  The passage of the photon is, however, objectively
indefinite, and so is the aliveness of the cat.  In other words, the
cat is suspended between life and death until it is observed [by a
person].  The conclusion is paradoxical, but at least it concerns
only the results of a thought experiment. (Shimony, 1988, p.
52)
Thus, in a circumstance where the observer is specified to be a person,
the change in the wave function is most naturally thought of as tied to the
perception of the human observer of the cat.  The same point holds, though, for
those circumstances where a macroscopic measuring instrument intervenes
between a quantum mechanical phenomenon that is in essence probabilistic in
nature.  It is a human observer who ultimately records the result of any
observation.  Indeed, the cat gedankenexperiment represents this situation as
the cat acts as a macroscopic measuring instrument and is also characterized by
the same probabilities as the microscopic physical phenomenon (i.e., the
photon) until a human observer makes his or her own observation of the cat.
(It has been discussed elsewhere how observation in quantum mechanics
necessarily means observation by a person, and in fact implies conscious
observation by a person [Snyder, 1989, 1990]).
After presenting his version of the Schrdinger gedankenexperiment,
Shimony discussed recent research that supports the thesis that it is specifically
the person as observer that is central to quantum mechanical measurement.
Shimony continued:
It is now more difficult to dismiss the paradoxical nature of the
conclusion [that the cat is neither dead nor alive until an
observation of it is made], because something similar to
Schrdinger's thought experiment has recently been achieved by
a number of groups of investigators. (p. 52)
Shimony went on to describe this work that involves the magnetic flux through
an almost closed superconducting ring, but in which the ends of the ring are
separated by a thin slice of insulating material called a Josephson junction.  An
electric current can circulate through the ring with electricity passing through the
Josephson junction in the quantum mechanical phenomenon called tunneling.
The electric current produces a magnetic field.  Associated with the component
of the magnetic field perpendicular to the ring is the magnetic flux through the
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ring.  For a uniform magnetic field, the value for the magnetic flux is the
product of the the magnetic field component perpendicular to the plane through
the superconducting ring multiplied by the area of the ring.  As the electric
current produces the magnetic field, and the electric current is comprised of a
great many moving electrons (on the order of 1023), the magnetic field can be
considered a macroscopic phenomenon and the flux can be considered a
macroscopic quantity characterizing the magnetic field.
Since it is a macroscopic quantity, the magnetic flux, in principle, does
not require a macroscopic entity, such as the cat, to register the measurement
result concerning a microscopic quantum mechanical existent so as to make the
result available for observation.  (In the Schrdinger gedankenexperiment, the
microscopic existent is the small amount of radioactive material.  In Shimony's
version, it is the photon.)  The magnetic field acts as both the radioactive
material, or the photon, and as the cat in Schrdinger's gedankenexperiment
and Shimony's version of it, respectively.  As this magnetic flux is a quantity
concerning a macroscopic physical existent, it is thus subject, in principle, to
direct inspection by a human observer.  In the research described by Shimony,
the magnetic flux could have one of two values when measured.  Though not
allowed classically unless there is an external source of energy impacting the
system, quantum mechanics allows for the spontaneous change in the values of
the flux.  This spontaneous change in the value of the flux depends on an
indefiniteness in the flux prior to its being measured akin to the indefiniteness
regarding whether or not the cat is alive in the Schrdinger gedankenexperiment
prior to the cat's being observed.
Even though he cited research indicating that a macroscopic measuring
instrument is not necessary in quantum mechanics, Shimony, in line with most
physicists, does not acknowledge the central role of the person as observer in
the change in the wave function associated with the observed physical system
that generally occurs when an observation is made.  He concluded his
discussion of the magnetic flux through an almost closed superconducting ring
by writing:
Some students of the subject [quantum measurement theory]
(including me) believe new physical principles must be
discovered before we can understand the peculiar kind of
irreversibility that occurs when an indefinite observable becomes
definite in the course of a measurement. (p. 53)
On the Quantum Mechanical
- 8 -
By not acknowledging the role of the human observer in the change in
the wave function that generally occurs when an observation is made, even in
his discussion of research in which the cat in Schrdinger's
gedankenexperiment is essentially taken out as an intermediate macroscopic
measuring instrument, Shimony does not fully acknowledge the probabilistic
basis of quantum mechanics.  In terms of theoretical consistency and simplicity,
acknowledging that quantum mechanics is fundamentally probabilistic in nature
would only confirm what is accepted on a practical level by most physicists
already.  This fundamentally probabilistic nature indicates that quantum
mechanics is concerned first with knowledge.  As Liboff (1992) noted, with the
development of quantum mechanics, "At the very core of natural law lay
subjective probability - not objective determinism [that characterized Newtonian
mechanics]" (p. 28).  Thus, it really is not so surprising that human observation
is also central to the nature of the wave function.
Shimony's acceptance on a practical level of the probabilistic nature of
the wave function and the thesis that it in general changes upon observation of
the existent with which it is associated is representative of most physicists.  So
is Shimony's reticence to accept on a fundamental level the straightforward
explanation of these features of quantum mechanics.  In portraying the cat
gedankenexperiment, Shimony acknowledged that quantum mechanics
accurately describes what is occurring in this gedankenexperiment.  It is
through the theory of quantum mechanics, and specifically the quantum
mechanical wave function, that the cat has an indefinite status regarding
whether it is alive which can be resolved only be an observation.
Without adopting this structure of the gedankenexperiment, Shimony
would not be presented with the scenario to which he subsequently expressed
reservations.  He would not have been able to conclude his discussion of the cat
gedankenexperiment by writing that the new principles he believed "must be
discovered" (p. 53) would still have to account for "the peculiar kind of
irreversibility that occurs when an indefinite [emphasis added] observable
becomes definite [emphasis added] in the course of a measurement" (p. 53).
The concept of an indefinite observable occurs in the theory of quantum
mechanics, and the observable's taking on a definite value occurs in the course
of a measurement in the theory of quantum mechanics.  Essentially, Shimony
maintained that some type of classical physical process will account for what
are uniquely quantum mechanical phenomena.
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EINSTEIN'S VIEW OF THE QUANTUM
MECHANICAL WAVE FUNCTION
Einstein's view of the quantum mechanical wave function essentially
follows the same analysis described by Shimony for the Schrdinger cat
gedankenexperiment.  After noting that Newtonian mechanics was readily
understood in terms of the realistic basis of physics in the quote presented at the
beginning of the paper, Einstein (1949/1969) continued:
Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is
thought independently of its being observed.  In this sense one
speaks of "physical reality."  In pre-quantum physics there was
no doubt as to how this was to be understood.  In Newton's
theory reality was determined by a material point in space and
time [functioning in a deterministic manner independent of
cognition]; in Maxwell's theory, by the field in space and time.
In quantum mechanics it is not so easily seen [i.e., the realistic
basis of physics].  If one asks: does a Y-function of the
quantum theory represent a real factual system of points or of an
electromagnetic field, one hesitates to reply with a simple "yes"
or "no"; why?  What the Y-function (at a definite time) asserts,
is this: What is the probability for finding a definite physical
magnitude q (or p) in a definitely given interval, if I measure it at
time t? [This is feature 1 of the quantum mechanical wave
function noted above.]  The probability is here to be viewed as
an empirically determinable, and therefore certainly as a "real"
quantity which I may determine if I create the same Y-function
very often and perform a q-measurement each time.  But what
about the single measured value of q?  Did the respective
individual system have this q-value even before the
measurement?  To this question there is no definite answer
within the framework of the [existing] theory, since the
measurement is a process which implies a finite disturbance of
the system from the outside [with the change in wave function,
feature 2, the chief consequence of this finite disturbance this is
feature 2 of the quantum mechanical wave function noted
above]; it would therefore be thinkable that the system obtains a
definite numerical value for q (or p), i.e., the measured
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numerical value, only through the measurement itself. (p. 83)3
Then Einstein presented the essence of a gedankenexperiment that he had
proposed earlier with Podolsky and Rosen (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen,
1935).
  We now present the following instance:  There is to be a
system which at the time t of our observation consists of two
partial systems S1 and S2, which at this time are spatially
separated and (in the sense of the classical physics) are without
significant reciprocity.  The total system is to be completely
described through a known Y-function Y12 in the sense of
quantum mechanics.  All quantum theoreticians now agree upon
the following: If I make a complete measurement of S1, I get
from the results of the measurement and from Y12 an entirely
definite Y-function Y2 of the system S2.  The character of Y2
then depends upon what kind of measurement I undertake on
S1.
Now it appears to me that one may speak of the real factual
situation of the partial system S2....On one supposition we
should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the real factual
situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with
the system S1, which is spatially separated from the former.
According to the type of measurement which I make of S1, I
get, however, a very different Y2 for the second partial system
(Y2, Y21,...).  Now, however, the real situation of S2 must be
independent of what happens to S1.  For the same real situation
of S2 it is possible therefore to find, according to one's choice,
different types of Y-function.  (One can escape from this
conclusion only by either assuming that the measurement of S1
((telepathically)) changes the real situation of S2 or by denying
independent real situations as such to things which are spatially
separated from each other.  Both alternatives appear to me
entirely unacceptable.)
If now...physicists...accept this consideration as valid, then
                                    
3 The term "existing," along with the brackets that enclose it, that are found in the quote are
actually part of the quoted material and not added by myself.
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B [a particular physicist] will have to give up his position that
the Y-function constitutes a complete description of a real
factual situation.  For in this case [i.e., the case of a complete
description] it would be impossible that two different types of
Y-functions [representing mutually exclusive situations] could
be co-ordinated [simultaneously] with the identical factual
situation of S2 [the same concrete physical circumstances].
(Einstein, 1949/1969, pp. 85, 87)
Bohr's (1935) response to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's
gedankenexperiment was that there is an unavoidable interaction between the
physical existent measured and the measuring instrument in their
gedankenexperiment that cannot be ignored.  Essentially, Bohr's response was
that the situation that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were referring to is
essentially quantum mechanical in its structure.  That is, the structure of the
gedankenexperiment presented by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen was based
on: 1) probabilistic prediction rooted in the quantum mechanical wave function
that describes the physical system, and 2) the in general immediate change
throughout space of the wave function upon measurement of the physical
system.
Furthermore, Bohr was saying that because the situation described by
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen is framed within the theory of quantum
mechanics, their result that two very different wave functions (really two
mutually exclusive views of the world) can simultaneously characterize the
same concrete physical circumstances simultaneously in quantum mechanics is
incorrect.4  According to Bohr, the particular interaction of the measuring
apparatus and S1 is associated with a specific state of S2 upon the measurement
                                    
4 The wave functions can be considered to simultaneously characterize the same concrete
physical circumstances, S2, because:
(1) in quantum mechanics, there is no physical limitation in principle on the
implementation of the particular measurement procedure used on S2;
(2) the velocity limitation of the special theory precludes a physical existent from
mediating the change in wave functions from Y12 for S1 and S2 before the
measurement on S1 to a specific wave function characterizing S1 and a specific wave
function characterizing S2 after the measurement on S1.
The instantaneous change in the wave function Y12 to the wave functions Y1 for S1 and Y2
for S2 throughout space when S1 is measured falls outside the causal structure of spacetime in
the special theory.  This causal structure involving past and future is limited by the velocity
of light in vacuum in an inertial reference frame.
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of S1.  But Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's result is basically correct.  Two
very different wave functions can indeed simultaneously characterize the same
concrete physical circumstances, even if the state of S2 depends on the
measurement result at S1.  As noted in feature 2 of the quantum mechanical
wave function, a change in wave function upon measurement of the physical
entity with which it is associated occurs immediately throughout space.
Where Bohr was correct was in noting that their conception of physical
reality that "physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought
independently of its being observed" (Einstein, 1949/1969, pp. 81) is not part
of quantum mechanics.  And it is quantum mechanics that they used to structure
their gedankenexperiment.  In not allowing for the interaction between the
physical existent measured and the measuring process of which the observer is
the chief component in defining an element of physical reality, they were able to
frame their argument so that the result was that quantum mechanics is not a
complete theory of the physical world.  Thus, Bohr was correct in his criticism
up to a point, and Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen were correct without the
artificial constraint of their realistic definition of the physical world and its
essential independence of the physical theory describing it.
THE BEHAVIORISTS
Physicists implementing the experimental conditions noted by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen have been able to go a long way toward realizing their
theoretical result concerning the possibility of simultaneous mutually exclusive
situations characterizing the same concrete physical circumstances.  The work
of Aspect, Dalibard, and Roger (1982) and Aspect, Grangier, and Roger
(1982) is an example.  But they have not been able to fully implement this
result.  This is because physicists have focussed only on manipulating the
physical circumstances which are concerned directly with the physical existent
measured and the measuring instrument used to measure this existent (e.g., S2)
in implementing Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's result.  That they have
focussed only on these physical circumstances has allowed physicists to
maintain that the condition of simultaneity of mutually exclusive situations for
the same concrete physical circumstances could not be met.  Essentially, while
this condition has not been met, physicists have maintained that a cognitive
aspect of the result presented by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, a result that is
tied to the nature of the quantum mechanical wave function, could not be
supported.  The position of physicists as concerns quantum mechanics is
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similar to the position held by the behaviorists in psychology in the earlier part
of the 1900's.
Throughout much of this century, behaviorism was the dominant
theoretical model in American psychology.  For a number of years, behaviorists
conducted animal studies in extremely constrained experimental arrangements
while testing a model of behavior that considered the mind to be essentially a
relay station between incoming stimuli and bodily responses.  Generally
speaking, the connection between environmental stimuli and bodily responses
depended on drive reduction (e.g., a decrease in hunger) where drive reduction
was defined in terms of environmental variables (e.g., amount of time since last
presentation of food).  Hull's 1943 behavioral system is a case in point.
Hilgard and Bower (1975) noted that for Hull, "Habit strength (SHR) [i.e.,
learning] is the result of a reinforcement of stimulus-response connections in
accordance with their proximity to need [and drive] reduction" (p. 161).
Psychologists conducted studies of learning where, for example, rats
were placed in mazes with goal boxes and environmental variables, such as the
quantity of food in the goal box, were manipulated to see their effect on the
learned ability of rats to reach the goal box.  In many studies conducted over a
number of years, behaviorists found that the results of their experiments largely
supported the major premise of their model, namely that learning could be
understood as the effect of environmental stimuli or conditions on bodily
responses.  But even in these constrained experimental circumstances, animals
showed evidence of cognitive activity, and eventually the data built to a point
where the theoretical structure of the behaviorists could no longer support this
data.  For example, Tolman (1932/1949) reported studies by Blodgett (1929)
and Tolman and Honzik (1930) who found that rats left to explore a maze in
which no food was placed in the goal box reached the criterion for learning
(e.g., time to reach the goal box) when trials were conducted with food in the
goal box more quickly than rats who did not have a chance to explore the maze
before these trials began.
In retrospect, it seems surprising that psychologists could hold with
such conviction that the mind was nothing more than a relay mechanism and
that they were unaware for the most part that the design of their experiments
would tend to produce results that supported this theory.  With physicists the
circumstances are somewhat different, but the strong commitment to a particular
view of the phenomena of their discipline, (i.e., physical phenomena) that
excludes a straightforward approach to these phenomena is similar to the
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attitude of the behaviorists concerning learning.  In addition, where physicists
limit their manipulation of experimental variables to those affecting the physical
existent measured and the measuring apparatus used in the measurement
process, physicists are very much like the behaviorists in the earlier part of the
1900's.  Physicists' choice of experimental arrangements serves to support
their particular outlook on physical phenomena by limiting their research to
those areas that will not explicitly indicate that their particular outlook is
incorrect.  As will be shown, there is another area where experimental variables
can be manipulated.  These are concerned with the act of observation.  In the
future, looking back on the present, it will appear surprising that physicists
could hold on to their inconsistent view of the wave function in quantum
mechanics for so long.
A CONTRIBUTION FROM PSYCHOLOGY
It is possible to implement Einstein's result that two very different wave
functions can simultaneously characterize the same concrete physical
circumstances.  And the manner in which it can be done only serves to
emphasize that the wave function is a link between cognition and the physical
world.  It can be done through studying the act of observation in quantum
mechanics, something that physicists have not done.  Implementing Einstein's
result relies on experimental work in psychology.  This research involves the
effects of altered incoming visual stimuli (i.e., light) on visual experience and
visually guided behavior.  Helmholtz, the physicist, was especially interested in
this research direction during the formative years of psychology that culminated
in the establishment of psychology as an independent discipline of study in the
latter 1800's.
Helmholtz (1866/1925) reported a study in which a subject wore prisms
that displaced objects, including his hand, that were in the field of view laterally
from what would have been their normal position had the subject not worn the
prisms.  In the first instance, the subject's hand was not in view and the subject
closed his eyes after having noted a particular object in his field of view.  When
he reached for the object, he missed it by reaching too far in the direction in
which the prisms displaced the object.  In reaching for an object, the subject
was guided by the position of the object he had seen through the prisms.
Repeated trials for the subject using the same method, or sometimes by quickly
touching an object with one's hand while viewing this process through the
prisms, resulted in the subject correctly touching the designated object when the
subject's eyes were closed.  After showing adaptation in this reaching behavior
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while wearing the prisms, repeating this method with the prisms removed, the
subject erred in reaching for a designated object in the opposite lateral direction
to that in which he original erred that occurred when the prisms were worn.
Repeated trials corrected these errors for the subject no longer wearing the
prisms.5
The specific research direction of concern in this paper involves
investigating the effects of a particular type of alteration of incoming visual
stimuli on visual experience and visually guided behavior.  This research
direction is concerned with the inversion of visual stimuli on the retina.  When
light enters the eye, it is reflected across both the horizontal and vertical that
divide the top and lower halves, as well as the right and left halveshemifields,
of the visual field.  The incoming visual stimuli are up-down reversed and
right-left reversed (Dolezal, 1982; Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991).  (In the
context of this paper, unless more precisely specified, the terms "inversion" and
"inverted" will refer to either rotation of the incoming light 180o around the line
of sight, or the reflection [or flipping] of incoming light between the top and
lower halves of the visual field along the horizontal separating them.)  In the
late 1800's, Stratton, a professor of psychology at Berkeley, (1896, 1897a,
1897b) conducted two very interesting experiments in the very late 1800's.
Stratton investigated the effects on visual experience of rotating the incoming
visual stimuli 180o around the line of sight such that the retinal images were
right side up instead of being in their customary inverted orientation.  Stratton's
results were remarkable.  In commenting on the earlier experiment, he wrote:
                                    
5 The experiment is presented by Helmholtz as follows:
Take two glass prisms with refracting angles of about 16o and 18o, and place them
in a spectacle frame, with their edges both turned toward the left.  As seen through
these glasses, the objects in the field of view will all apparently be shifted to the left
of their real positions.  At first, without bringing the hand into the field, look
closely at some definite object within reach; and then close the eyes, and try to touch
the object with the forefinger.  The usual result will be to miss it by thrusting the
hand too far to the left.  But after trying for some little while, or, more quickly still,
by inserting the hand in the field and, under the guidance of the eye, touching the
objects with it for an instant, then on trying the above experiment again, we shall
discover that now we do not miss the objects, but feel for them correctly.  It is the
same way when new objects are substituted for those with which we have become
familiar.  Having learned how to do this, suppose now we take off the prisms and
remove the hand from the field of view, and then, after gazing steadily at some
object, close our eyes and try to take hold of it.  We find then that the hand will miss
the object by being thrust too far to the right; until after several failures, our
judgment of the direction of the eyes is rectified again. (Helmholtz, 1866/1925, p.
246)
On the Quantum Mechanical
- 16 -
In fact, the difficulty of seeing things upright by means of
upright retinal images seems to consist solely in the resistance
offered by the long-established experience.  There is certainly no
peculiar inherent difficulty arising from the new conditions
themselves.  If no previous experience had been stored up to
stand in opposition to the new perceptions, it would be absurd
to suppose that the visual perceptions in such a case would seem
inverted.  Any visual field in which the relations of the seen
parts to one another would always correspond to the relations
found by touch and muscular movement would give us 'upright'
vision, whether the optic image lay upright, inverted, or at any
intermediate angle whatever on the retina. (Stratton, 1896, p.
617)
His comments apply as well to the results of the second, more thorough
experiment.  In his report on the second experiment, he wrote:
The inverted position of the retinal image is, therefore, not
essential to 'upright vision,' for it is not essential to a harmony
between touch and sight, which, in the final analysis, is the real
meaning of upright vision.  For some visual objects may be
inverted with respect to other visual objects, but the whole
system of visual objects can never by itself be either inverted or
upright.  It could be inverted or upright only with respect to
certain non-visual experiences with which I might compare my
visual system--in other words, with respect to my tactual or
motor perceptions. (Stratton, 1897b, pp. 475-476)
Subsequent work by other researchers in which all incoming visual stimuli
were rotated 180o around the line of sight (e.g., Ewert, 1930; Snyder &
Pronko, 1952) or up-down reversed (the top and bottom halves of the visual
field are reversed) (e.g., Dolezal, 1982; Kohler, 1962, 1964) has for the most
part, if not entirely, provided substantial support for Stratton's finding
concerning the relative nature of upright vision.  The research indicates that
there is a high degree of flexibility of the visual system with regard to inversion
of incoming visual stimulation on the retina, including that an observer subject
to such reversal quickly regains very significant competency in interacting with
the environment.
For example, Snyder and Pronko (1952) found in their study:
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During the 30-day period that the inverting lenses were worn,
the visuo-motor coordinations were refashioned so that the
subject performed even better than before the lenses were put
on....Introducing the inverted visual field for 30 days and
subsequent "normalization" (lenses removed), [sic] modified the
learning situation.  However, the subject went on learning
despite these disrupting factors (p. 166).
In general, visual experience restabilizes quickly considering the relatively very
brief period of time that the visual stimuli are reversed compared to the subjects'
life experiences prior to their participation in one of the experiments.
In the laboratory, competency on sensorimotor tasks developed with
unrotated light has been shown to transfer to circumstances where incoming
light is rotated 180o (Ewert, 1930; Snyder & Pronko, 1952).  Furthermore,
increased competency on the same sensorimotor tasks subsequently developed
with rotated light has been shown to transfer to circumstances where the
incoming light is no longer rotated 180o (Ewert, 1930; Snyder & Pronko,
1952).  The learning curve for these sensorimotor tasks was in general fairly
smooth, except for a spike when the incoming visual stimuli were first rotated
180o around the line of sight.  In natural settings, individuals wearing some
form of optical apparatus that inverted incoming visual stimuli have reported
such activities as driving an automobile, riding a motorcycle, or riding a bicycle
with a significant degree of skill within a relatively short time of putting on the
apparatus for the first time (Dolezal, 1982; Kohler, 1962).  Research has
indicated that after a relatively brief period of time exposed to inverted visual
stimuli, visual experience in general appears normal and as this normal visual
experience exists in conjunction with the recaptured competency of the
individual in the environment, the visual field is upright in the same way that it
was upright before the incoming visual stimuli were reversed (Dolezal, 1982;
Kohler, 1962, 1964; Snyder & Pronko, 1952).
In a related study, Brown (1928) wore goggles with prisms that rotated
incoming light 75o around the line of sight for one week, and he demonstrated
a significant degree of adaptation to this rotation.  This occurred even though he
described his apparatus as "too unwieldy" (p. 134) to wear every night on a
one-half mile trip to his university where various tests were run.  Other work
investigating adaptation of the visual system to alterations in incoming visual
stimuli have also indicated a very high degree of flexibility in the operation of
the visual system (e.g., Gibson, 1933; Held, 1965; Held & Freedman, 1963).
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Ewert (1930) and Munn (1955/1965), one of Ewert's subjects in his
experiment with rotated visual stimuli, have disputed the finding that visual
experience becomes upright and, in general, normal after some experience with
rotated incoming visual stimuli.  It should be noted, though, that the major
concern of Ewert and Munn is not so much the subject's phenomenal
experience with rotated light but rather with the interpretation of what this
phenomenal experience means.  For example, Munn (1955/1965) wrote:
Localizing reactions became so automatic at times that a 'feeling
of normalcy' was present.  This is probably the feeling reported
by Stratton and interpreted as "seeing right-side up." (p. 293)
Or, Ewert concluded that:
In all forms of activity where overt localizing responses are
present there is rapid adjustment to the distracting visual
interference until at the end of 14 days of practice the
interference is entirely overcome in some of the activities
investigated and almost overcome in the other forms....Constant
interference during visual disorientation does not prevent the
steady growth of a habit. (Ewert, 1930, pp. 353, 357)
Snyder and Pronko (1952) performed an experiment similar in many
respects to Ewert's.  Munn wrote about Snyder and Pronko's work: "The
results were essentially like his [Ewert's]" (p. 294).  In contrast to Ewert,
Snyder and Pronko concluded:
It appears that perceivings form a behavior sequence going back
into the individual's past.  If the subject of the present
experiment had always worn the inverting lenses, his past
perceivings would have been of a piece with those of the
moment when the question ["Well, how do things look to you?
Are they upside-down?" (p. 113)] was directed at him.
Obviously, then, they would not have been in contrast with the
latter and would not have called attention to themselves.  Stated
in another way, if this subject had somehow developed amnesia
at the point at which he put on the inverting lenses, then things
could not appear upside-down because there would be no basis
of comparison or contrast.  That they did appear upside-down is
clearly a strict function of his previously acquired perceivings.
(pp. 113-114)
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In A History of Experimental Psychology, Boring (1929/1950) wrote about
Stratton's work:
In 1896 Stratton put the matter to test, having his subjects
[actually only Stratton himself] wear a system of lenses which
reversed the retinal image and made it right side up.  The
expected happened.  The perceived world looked upside down
for a time and then became reversed.  Taking the glasses off
resulted once again in reversal which was soon corrected.
Stratton was not, however, confused by the homunculus.  He
described how up was nothing in the visual sensory pattern
other than the opposite of down, and that orientation is achieved
by the relation of the visual pattern to somothesis and behavior.
When you reach up to get an object imaged at the top of the
retina, then you have indeed got the visual field reversed and
will not find the object unless you have on Stratton's lenses.
Ewert repeated this experiment in 1930, with similar
results....Had the view of a freely perceiving agent in the brain
not been so strongly entrenched, this problem could not have
continued to seem so important in 1604, 1691, 1709, 1838,
1896 and 1930 [1930 being the year that Ewert reported his
experimental findings]. (p. 678)
Boring knew of Ewert's work and saw that the empirical results obtained by
Ewert supported Stratton's conclusion even if Ewert's own conclusion based
on the empirical results he found were not in agreement with Stratton's
conclusions.  Boring saw that Ewert's experimental results did not seriously
challenge Stratton's work.  Dolezal (1982) wrote concerning the results of his
experiment and those found in other experiments:
In the course of living in a world transformed, the observer's
initial fears become calmed, he or she finds the discomforts
quite tolerable, the strange sights fade and become common, and
ineptness changes to competency. (p. 301)
In sum, research has shown that in inversion of visual stimuli on the
retina, a sense of normalcy returns to a significant degree to visual experience
accompanied by a return to high levels of competency in visually guided
behavior.  Both of these events support Stratton's conclusion that upright
vision returns after an individual gains experience in the world with inverted
visual stimuli.
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A Biperceptual Capability
Dolezal has proposed that the observer who adapts to inversion of
incoming visual stimuli is biperceptual and biperformatory.  Biperceptual refers
to the simultaneous existence of the visual perceptual capabilities associated
with both pre-inversion and post-inversion conditions.  Yet these capabilities
are also divided into distinct reference frames for the individual who has
undergone inversion of incoming visual stimuli.  Similarly, biperformatory
refers to the simultaneous existence of an individual's capabilities to act
competently in the environment both before and after inversion of the incoming
visual stimuli.  Yet these capabilities are divided into distinct areas for the
individual who has experienced and adapted to this inversion of incoming
visual stimuli.  Dolezal (1982) wrote:
The adapted observer appears to differ from the unadapted
observer in several main respects.  After some 200 hours of
living with reversing prisms, an observer once again
experiences visual stability of the perturbed environment [i.e.,
up-down reversal of incoming visual stimuli].  This is true for a
wide range of rates of head movements (HMs).  Moreover, the
adapted observer has acquired what may be called another
"personality" (i.e., he or she has the dual facility to be
perceptually and emotionally comfortable and to act competently
both with and without transforming prisms).  The adapted
observer is thus a very different creature from the unadapted
observer--somewhat like someone with a second language or a
novel set of skills that can only be directly displayed under
special circumstances (cf. state-dependent learning and recall).
The observer becomes what I call biperceptual and
biperformatory....In general, the adapted observer is capable of
living in both worlds, under both sets of information conditions
and behavioral requirements with roughly equal comfort and
competence. (p. 297)
Dolezal discussed some anecdotal evidence from his own experience to support
his thesis of biperceptual and biperformatory capabilities.  For example, if there
were not some memory specifically associated with learning while wearing up-
down reversing prisms that remained accessible after the experiment was
completed, then how did Dolezal have an immediate sense of familiarity with a
particular scene when donning the prisms a year after the experiment was
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completed?  Or, if the memory was not tied specifically to his experience while
wearing the reversing prisms, why would Dolezal find it difficult to recognize
an individual after the experiment that he had only seen prior to that time while
wearing the reversing prisms?
Consider the following observation reported by the subject in Snyder
and Pronko's study, who happened to be Snyder:
Toward the end of the experiment [i.e., the period in which the
subject wore the inverting glasses], the subject was adequately
adjusted [adapted].  The following insightful experience
occurred.  He was observing the scene from a tall building.
Suddenly someone asked, "Well, how do things look to you?
Are they upside-down?"
  The subject replied, "I wish you hadn't asked me.  Things
were all right until you popped the question at me.  Now, when
I recall how they did look before I put on these lenses, I must
answer that they do look upside down now.  But until the
moment that you asked me I was absolutely unaware of it and
hadn't given a thought to the question of whether things were
right-side-up or upside-down." (Snyder & Pronko, 1952, p.
113).
In a study of retention of the effects of such inversion, Snyder and
Snyder (1957) found that when the inverted conditions are re-introduced for a
subject some time after the subject's initial experience with inverted visual
stimuli, the subject's adjustment the second time to the inverted visual stimuli
indicated that learning occurred as a result of the first experience and had been
retained over a two-year period between the first and second experiences with
inversion of the incoming visual stimuli.  Specifically, they found that the time
to complete various tasks consistently took less time to complete in the second
experience than in the first experience.  The learning curves in the first and
second experiences were very similar for each of the tasks, only in the second
exposure the times to complete the tasks were consistently lower than the times
to complete the tasks in the first exposure.
In his research, Stratton noted how quickly visual and other perceptions
and images could switch quickly from those characterizing experience while
wearing the inverting optical apparatus to those perceptions and images
characterizing experience before Stratton wore his optical apparatus.  He also
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noted the possibility of their coexistence.  For example, on the seventh day of
wearing his apparatus in the second experiment, Stratton (1897b) wrote:
When I watched one of my limbs in motion, no involuntary
suggestion arose that it was in any other place or moved in any
other direction than as sight actually reported it, except that in
moving my arm a slightly discordant group of sensations came
from my unseen shoulder.  If, while looking at the member, I
summoned an image of it in its old position, then I could feel the
limb there too.  But this latter was a relatively weak affair, and
cost effort.  When I looked away from it, however, I
involuntarily felt it in its pre-experimental position, although at
the same time conscious of a solicitation to feel it in its new
position.  This representation of the moving part in terms of the
new vision waxed and waned in strength, so that it was
sometimes more vivid than the old, and sometimes even
completely overshadowed it. (p. 465)
It is remarkable that the visual system has demonstrated a great degree
of flexibility in the inversion experiments given the degree of artificiality
introduced into the experimental circumstances by the optical apparatus that
have been used.  For example, Stratton used a device that allowed for incoming
light to only one eye while the other eye was covered over the time Stratton
wore the device.  Ewert's device was lightweight but allowed for a limited
visual field.  In an attempt to widen the visual field over that of most other
experiments in which all of incoming stimuli are reversed for an extended
period of time, Dolezal (1982) built his optical device out of a football helmet in
which glass prisms were inserted in the limited space usually left open for a
football player to see.  His device weighed 8 pounds, 6 ounces.  There is
further work to be done in this area of the effect of inverted visual stimuli on
visual experience and visually guided action.  But the basic result that there is
significant adaptation in visual experience and visually guided action to
inversion of incoming visual stimuli has been established.6
                                    
6 One avenue for further work is suggested by anecdotal evidence developed using the recently
developed technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging that changes in visual
experience resulting from a rotation of the incoming visual stimuli on the retina are reflected
in neurophysiological processes.  (Anecdotal evidence is all that is available at the present
time.)  In an experiment that employed this technique, subjects wore glasses that divided their
visual fields so an eye would see only half its usual stimuli.  The researcher, Schneider,
found, "I was getting data on one person and it looked like his brain was upside down.  I
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Hard Wiring of the Visual
System and the Isotropy of Space
Originally, Stratton was concerned with showing that two theories
concerning inversion of incoming light were incorrect.  Essentially, these
theories maintained some sort of hard-wiring of either the neural component of
the visual system (the projection theory) or its supporting musculature (the eye
movement theory).  In the projection theory, inversion of the retinal image was
needed because of the crossing of the lines of direction of light from external
objects when light from the external world moves through the eye.  Perception
of objects was considered to follow these lines of direction that projected
outward to the upright objects in the physical world from which the light rays
originated.
The eye movement theory related to the use of the musculature about the
eye to provide definitive information about the correct position of the objects in
the world.  Thus, if the eyes move upward in their sockets, they see the upper
parts of objects in the physical world that are before them, and if the eyes move
                                                                                               
checked and rechecked the numbers wondering what the heck was going on.  Then I found out
he had put the glasses on wrong, so that his visual field was flipped upside down.  I didn't
know it at the time, but just by looking at this brain I could tell he was seeing upside down"
(Blakeslee, 1993, p. B6).  Thus, it is important to systematically investigate the initial
neurophysiological representation of rotated visual stimuli as well as the later
neurophysiological representation of these rotated visual stimuli.
It is predicted based on the anecdotal evidence that the rotation of the neurophysiological
representation would be confirmed when the change in orientation of incoming light first
occurs.  Some time later, it is predicted that at least one element of the neurophysiological
representation will revert to that which would occur if the incoming light had not been
rotated.  The latter prediction derives from the anecdotal evidence and the evidence of
reorientation of visual experience to being upright after some time when the incoming stimuli
are rotated 180o.  If the predictions are confirmed, the empirical evidence would lend support
to the conclusions of previous work on the reorientation of visual stimuli on the retina that
relied on behavioral and experiential evidence.  These predictions, if confirmed, would also
imply tremendous plasticity in neurological functioning.  It was because of his hunch that
there was great plasticity in neurological functioning that Stratton undertook his original
research to see whether the projection theory of vision or the eye movement theory, both of
which implied hard wiring of the visual system, would hold up to experimental scrutiny.
It is possible that this last suggested experimental modification could be explored in an
animal study where degree of adaptation to rotation of incoming visual stimuli can be assessed
behaviorally.  Behavior and neurophysiological function could be studied to see if:
1) there is modification of the neurophysiological representation of the visual world that
correlates with confused behavior upon an animal's wearing an optical apparatus that rotates
incoming light, and 2) there is a return of the neurophysiological representation of the visual
world to its pre-rotation status that correlates with regained behavioral competency when the
apparatus is removed.
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downward in their sockets, they see the lower part of these objects in the
physical world that are before them.  In this process, though, movement of the
eye upward, for example, results in the lower portion of the retina receiving
more of the incoming light.  Inversion of the incoming light would correct this
problem and would allow for eye movements to indicate the upright nature of
the physical world.
Basically, physicists have held to the basic tenet behind the projection
theory and the eye movement theory that there is only one way that the visual
system can function in order that the physical world is perceived as upright.
This is an assumption that Boring (1929/1950) maintained was inappropriate
from 1604 and onward, and he maintained it was based on the notion of the
homunculus.  It can be seen in the descriptions provided of the projection
theory and the eye movement theory that both theories carry another tenet as an
assumption regarding the physical world.  This tenet is that the physical world
itself has an absolute status as regards its being upright.  For example, if the
physical world were indeed upside down, would scholars seriously entertain a
theory of visual perception based on the hard wiring of the visual system?  It
should be noted that this tenet violates an extension of the concept of the
isotropy of space in that the directions in space are not fundamentally alike.
ALTERING THE EXPERIMENTAL
CIRCUMSTANCES WITHOUT CHANGING
THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM OR THE
APPARATUS USED TO MEASURE IT
It remains to show how this adaptability of visual experience and
visually guided behavior to inversion of incoming visual stimuli allows
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's result concerning the simultaneous existence
of mutually exclusive situations applied to the same concrete physical
circumstances to be realized in an experiment.
Stratton's results, and those of other researchers following his general
line of research, provide an avenue for demonstrating that mutually exclusive
circumstances concerning the same concrete physical circumstances nonetheless
may be simultaneously perceived in a uniform way.  Essentially, this work has
shown that though sensory data impinging on us may indeed be of
fundamentally different forms, the perception associated with this data may be
uniform.  The work of Stratton and those who followed after him is not the
only work to demonstrate this point.  This point is at the heart of perceptual
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constancies.  For example, though not concerned with mutually exclusive
versions of reality, size constancy and shape constancy also indicate a
uniformity of perception even though the associated sensory data impinging on
us may vary widely in character.
Stratton's results are particularly relevant to the simultaneous, mutually
exclusive situations allowed in quantum mechanics and provide the basis for an
empirical test of them.  Consider the spin angular momentum of an electron.  It
is possible to measure the component of this momentum along any one of three
orthogonal axes, x, y, and z (three spatial axes all at right angles to one
another).  Assume in an idealized experiment that this measurement occurs from
direct visual inspection of the electron in the following way.  Through the use
of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus (Eisberg & Resnick, 1985; Liboff, 1992), a
nonuniform magnetic field oriented along the z axis is placed in the path of the
electron, and the subject watches to see which way the electron moves in the
field.  (As discussed, the introduction of a macroscopic measuring device does
not change the circumstances in any critical way.)  Assume the z axis is in the
vertical direction relative to the subject, appearing to go up and down.  Assume
that the y axis runs perpendicular to the ideal plane formed by the subject's face
and that prior to entering the nonuniform magnetic field the electron is traveling
along this axis.  Assume that the x axis runs horizontally relative to the subject,
from side to side.  The experimental circumstances are depicted in Figure 1,
where + and - refer to the positive and negative directions along a spatial axis.  
According to quantum mechanics, precise knowledge resulting from
measurement of one of these momentum components means that knowledge of
each of the other two momentum components is completely uncertain.  Precise
knowledge of the component along the z axis, for example, means that
knowledge of each of the components along the x and y axes is completely
uncertain.
This limitation concerning the knowledge of certain paired quantities in
quantum mechanics also characterizes the simultaneous precise determination of
the position and momentum of an electron (Eisberg & Resnick, 1985; Liboff,
1992).  Precise knowledge of the electron's momentum entails complete
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complete uncertainty regarding its momentum.  As Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen (1935) wrote:
It is shown in quantum mechanics that, if the operators
corresponding to two physical quantities, say A and B , do not
commute, that is, if AB ¹ BA, then the precise knowledge of
one of them precludes such a knowledge of the other.
Furthermore, any attempt to determine the latter experimentally
will alter the state of the system in such a way as to destroy the
knowledge of the first. (p. 778)
Where A and B are the operators corresponding to the components of the
position and momentum of an electron, respectively, along a particular spatial
axis, they do not commute.  Similarly, where A and B are the operators for any
two components along orthogonal spatial axes of the spin angular momentum
of an electron, they do not commute.
One can use an apparatus like that developed by Stratton to rotate the
incoming light to an experimental subject such that the light is rotated around
the y axis ninety degrees.  Then, what was information concerning the z axis is
now information concerning the x axis as concerns the light impinging on the
subject's retina.  Given Stratton's results, there is a good possibility that, after a
period of orientation with this apparatus, particularly if it is worn for an
uninterrupted period in the natural environment, the subject will see the electron
moving up or down and not sideways.
Indeed, the natural scenarios tested by Stratton and others are potentially
much more complex than the scenario that could be presented to an observer in
a laboratory setting observing the path of an electron along a spatial axis in an
inhomogenous magnetic field like that created by a Stern-Gerlach apparatus.  It
does appear that adaptation to inverted visual stimuli depends to a significant
degree on a subject's experience in moving in his environment while incoming
stimuli are inverted by the optical apparatus.  Thus, the observer in the
proposed experiment should continually wear the apparatus in the natural
environment during waking hours.  Because of the uncomplicated nature of the
adaptation in the proposed experiment, though, a minimal amount of motor
experience by the subject might be sufficient for the necesary degree of
adaptation of the visual perceptual system to occur.
Once this degree of adaptation occurs in the subject's visual experience,
according to the information impinging on the subject's retina, the subject is
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measuring what in the original situation without rotation of the incoming light is
the x axis.  What for observers in the original situation is up and down along
the z axis is for the subject up and down along the x axis (Figure 2).  For this
subject, the spin components along the y and z axes are completely uncertain.
Thus, it appears possible to have simultaneous, mutually exclusive situations
involving the components of spin angular momentum of the electron along two
orthogonal spatial axes.  These situations do not exist for the same individual in
this particular example, but nonetheless the example shows that, in a general
way, simultaneous, mutually exclusive situations can occur.
Evidence supporting a biperceptual character of visual perception after
adaptation to inversion of incoming visual stimuli has been noted.  As
discussed, this biperceptual character after adaptation concerns the simultaneous
existence of the distinct visual perceptual capabilities associated with both pre-
inversion and post-inversion conditions.  It may indeed be possible for one
subject in the experiment outlined above involving spin angular momentum
components along orthogonal spatial axes to be involved in mutually exclusive
situations simultaneously concerning the same concrete physical circumstances.
That is, the adapted subject may be able to instantly shift from being involved in
one of the experimental scenarios to the other.
There is another expression of simultaneous mutually exclusive
situations besides that already discussed that is perhaps even more surprising.
Consider that an optical apparatus is used that rotates incoming visual stimuli
180o around the line of sight.  For the subject wearing the device but not yet
adapted, the negative direction of the z axis is associated with spin up and the
positive direction of the z  axis is associated with spin down.  Once a significant
degree of adaptation in the subject's visual experience occurs, when the subject
observes that an electron has spin up in the positive direction of the z  axis,
according to the information impinging on the subject's retina the subject is
measuring what in the original situation without rotation of the incoming light is
spin up in the negative direction of the z axis.  Similarly, when the subject
observes that an electron has spin down in the negative direction of the z  axis,
according to the information impinging on the subject's retina the subject is
measuring what in the original situation without rotation of the incoming light is
spin down in the positive direction of the z axis (Figure 3).
If this result is considered in terms of the Schrdinger cat
gedankenexperiment, it is as if in one situation, one atom of the radioactive
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simultaneously in the other situation none of the radioactive material decayed,
leading to the cat being alive when observed.  One situation involves the
observer who has not worn the optical device and who is not wearing the
device when he or she observes the electron.  The other situation involves the
observer who is wearing the apparatus when observing the electron and who
has adapted to the rotated visual field.  In contrast to the Schrodinger cat
gedankenexperiment, each observer's perception is similar in structure.  But
while the effect of the rotation of incoming light for a subject is mitigated upon
adaptation, the historical physical event of the rotation of the incoming light due
to the optical apparatus remains for the observer wearing the device and acts to
distinguish the two situations of the observers.
In this regard, a portion of BoringÕs (1929/1950) quote presented above
is particularly relevant.
[Stratton] described how up was nothing in the visual sensory
pattern other than the opposite of down, and that orientation is
achieved by the relation of the visual pattern to somothesis and
behavior.  When you reach up to get an object imaged at the top
of the retina, then you have indeed got the visual field reversed
and will not find the object unless you have on Stratton's lenses.  
(p. 678)
The world and the subjectÕs experience of the world thus do not appear
changed, unless, as the data suggest, the subject thinks about his wearing the
optical apparatus and the subsequent experiential and behavioral change that
accompanies the initial presentation of light to the retina after it passes through
the optical apparatus.
A Possible Objection
One might object to this conclusion regarding the ÒrightingÓ of the
visual field for the adapted subject in the following way.  The artificial
reorientation of the incoming light does not prevent tracing back light impacting
the retina to the physical existent that is the source of the light so that the actual
spin component of the electron along a particular axis in space and the visual
perceptions of the electronÕs spin component in space by the observer for
whom light is not inverted, or otherwise rotated, and by the individual adapted
to the incoming, altered light are all in agreement.  That is, both observers
correctly deduce the spin component of the electron because they correctly
perceive the motion of the electron in space along the spatial axis along which it
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is traveling.  Then the visual system could be said to simply adapt to the
artificial change in incoming light but that the internal sensory coordination by
the observer ultimately reflects the absolute positioning of the electronÕs motion
in space as it moves through the Stern-Gerlach device.
But, consider that instead of using an external optical system to alter the
orientation of incoming light, another method is used in the gedanken-
experiment to change the orientation of light on the retina.  Consider that the
retinas of an observer with their supporting physiological structures in the eye,
in particular the optic nerve, are rotated 180
o
.  In this arrangement, an optical
apparatus external to the visual system is no longer used.  (Both procedures
accomplish the same goal, rotation of incoming light 180
o on the retina.)  The
results, though, of using either the external optical system or reorienting the
retinas themselves should be the same.  The human subject whose retinas have
been reoriented should with adaptation see the world upright even though the
incoming light falls on the retinas in the opposite manner to that found for the
observer whose retinas have not been reoriented, where space is considered in
terms of the spatial structure of this latter observer.  By reorienting the retinas
themselves, one can no longer reasonably subscribe to the thesis that the visual
system is simply accounting for the artificial nature of the external optical
apparatus in order to correctly ascertain the absolute positioning of the
electronÕs motion in space.  Here, no extra instrument is added.  Only the
orientation of the incoming light relative to the retina has been changed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
EINSTEIN'S GEDANKENEXPERIMENT
In Einstein's gedankenexperiment, the circumstances involving S2 are
akin to the experiment discussed above involving the spin angular momentum
of an electron traveling through a nonuniform magnetic field in a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus.  That is, one could essentially apply the experimental arrangement
discussed above, including the use of a suitable optical apparatus for the human
observer, directly to S2.  One very likely would find that both wave functions
in Einstein's gedankenexperiment could describe S2 for different observers,
one wearing the apparatus and the other not.  In view of the results on
biperceptual experience resulting from inversion of incoming visual stimuli,
perhaps one would find that both wavefunctions could describe S2 for the same
observer.  Thus, Einstein's result is not only the correct result theoretically in
quantum mechanics, but is also subject to empirical test.  Because of the results
of the experiments in psychology that have been cited and because these results
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are concerned with adaptation to much more complex perceptual circumstances
than would likely occur in the proposed experiment concerning the spin
component of electrons along a spatial axis, it is expected that such an
experiment would support Einstein's theoretical result that "very different"
(Einstein, 1949/1969, pp. 85) wave functions can simultaneously describe the
same physical circumstances in the manner described.
HOW HAS THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACT OF
OBSERVATION BEEN MISSED?
Why have physicists generally missed the significance of the act of
observation, and specifically human observation, in quantum mechanics?  And
why have they missed the assumed anisotropy of space that is tied to the
assumption of an absolute upright status of the physical world in visual
perception?  More practically, how, for example, could physicists at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology have missed the significance of Held's
work, some of the most significant on the plasticity of perception, to their own
work?  Held has been on the faculty at MIT in the Department of Brain and
Cognitive Sciences for many years.
In part, physicists have missed the significance of the act of observation
because they have looked for consciousness, or cognition in general, to be like
a physical object in quantum mechanics, not as an act for which physical
objects are the objects of perception.  This view of consciousness has allowed
Adler (1989) to essentially propose that the discovery of the neutrino depended
on a cognitive choice by physicists concerning the content of physical theory in
the face of ambiguous empirical results while framing his argument in terms of
general philosophical tenets instead of this cognitive choice.
I believe there is little reason to be convinced by this experiment
[the definitive experiment by Cowan, Reines, Harrison, Kruse,
and McGuire (1956)] that the neutrino exists apart from the
theory and experiments that define it.  The theory of beta decay
is embedded in the larger theory of conventional physics and the
experiment is constructed according to the rules of conventional
physics.  The neutrino is then a necessary constituent of the
theory and the associated experiment.  It exists as a building
block of physics, but does it necessarily exist apart from the
physics that defines it--I think not! (Adler, 1989, p. 880)
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Instead of discussing the cognitive framework of physicists who consider the
neutrino, Adler attempted to place his view within the philosophical positions of
realism, anti-realism, arealism, phenomenalism, and instrumentalism (Snyder,
1990).
As another example, consider a comment by the physical scientist
Elitzur (1991) that psychology and physics "do not get along well, especially
when the subject of consciousness is brought up" (p. 306)  He noted that
"physics sees no observable evidence for it [the existence of consciousness]"
(p. 306).  As represented in the Schrdinger cat gedankenexperiment or the
proposed experiment involving an electron traveling through a nonuniform
magnetic field, in quantum mechanics, one does not look at consciousness, or
perceiving, as one looks at a physical existent.  In quantum mechanics, and in
experience in general, perceiving fundamentally is that through which the
physical world is known.  In quantum mechanics, perceiving is not an object in
the same sense that a physical existent, such as an electron, is an object for
observation.  In obtaining empirical evidence that the predictions of quantum
mechanics concerning physical existents are correct, one obtains evidence for
the means in quantum mechanics through which information is gained in
measurement and theoretical formulations, namely human observation and
human cognition.  This is what a straightforward explanation of the quantum
mechanical wave function indicates.  One can go further.  For example, in the
Schrdinger cat gedankenexperiment and the experiment proposed here, the
data obtained from measurement concern physical existents.  As has been
shown, in manipulating how these data are received by the human observer,
one can demonstrate the significance of cognition in quantum mechanics.
There is a connection between physicists in general not seeing the
central role of the act of observation in quantum mechanics and their not seeing
that the probabilities in quantum mechanics are fundamentally concerned with
an individual's knowledge of the physical world.  That physicists do not fully
acknowledge that the quantum mechanical wave function provides the basis for
the probabilities that are fundamentally concerned with an individual's
knowledge of the physical world is tied to their failure to realize the significance
of Schrdinger's gedankenexperiment as concerns the relation of the human
observer to the physical world in quantum mechanics.
When a straightforward explanation of the nature of the quantum
mechanical wave function is proposed to physicists, their general response, if
they do respond, is that there is no new physics in the explanation, only an
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additional interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics (Elitzur,
1991).  Physicists want to see new empirical results that result from a
straightforward explanation of the quantum mechanical wave function.
Physicists generally maintain that a new result would convince them that the
wave function is an indivisible link between cognition and the physical world.
In maintaining this position, physicists miss the point that empirical evidence
already exists.  Essentially, they are looking for an event that does not fit in the
theory of quantum mechanics and which is also mediated by cognition.  Any
result that is predicted in the theory of quantum mechanics is for many
physicists subject to the criticism, "There is no new empirical result."
And yet, as discussed, it is the theory of quantum mechanics itself that
allows for the fundamental link between cognition and the physical world.  An
avenue for empirical confirmation is the one discussed above: empirical
evidence is found through adjusting the variables affecting the act of perceiving
and not those affecting the measured physical system itself.  The data obtained
in the measurement process concern quantities of the measured physical
system.  The expected empirical results are those predicted in quantum
mechanics.  Unlike the avenue outlined here, the new empirical result that
physicists maintain is necessary to demonstrate a fundamental link between
cognition and the physical world itself necessitates denying the fundamental
validity of quantum mechanics.  In a sense, physicists are asking those who
propose that this link exists to demonstrate it through finding the hidden
variables that would indicate that quantum mechanics is not the correct theory
describing the physical world and that some form of classical-like physical
theory correctly describes the physical world.
Physicists cannot expect that a new result that effectively contradicts
quantum mechanics can then be used to support the thesis that the wave
function is a link between cognition and the physical world.  Instead, it can be
expected that a cognitive component can affect how the results predicted by
quantum mechanics are manifested such that the unusual nature of the results
indicates that cognition does indeed play a role in quantum mechanics.  It can be
shown that cognition provides flexibility such that the empirical results achieved
using quantum mechanics are dependent on the cognitive processes in
individuals in a way that the physical world cannot mediate.  This is what is at
the heart of the Schrdinger cat gedankenexperiment.  The experiment proposed
in this paper is another attempt to demonstrate this point.
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How could this stance by physicists have come about?  Essentially, it
resulted from the creation of the discipline of psychology in the latter 1800's as
a distinct discipline, which was part of a larger pattern of differentiation of
knowledge into specialty disciplines in the late 19th century.  Philosophy and
physical and biological science were important influences on the development
of psychology as an independent discipline.  The physicists Helmholtz and
Fechner were particularly important in this development (Boring, 1929/1950).
The experiment reported by Helmholtz above clearly had a significant
psychological dimension.  If his argument on the relation of vision and touch is
followed a bit further, his interest and skill in exploring psychological
phenomena is even more apparent:
Here [in the experiment where an observer wears the glass
prisms] it is not the muscular feeling of the hand that is at fault
or the judgment of its position, but the judgment of the direction
of the gaze, as is shown by the fact that, if after having become
used to looking through the prisms and finding the visible
objects with the right hand, then we close our eyes and try to
touch the same objects with the left hand, which has not been
previously used, and which was not in the field of view, we
find that there will not be any difficulty about touching them
with perfect certainty and precision.  Accordingly, in a case of
this kind the place is determined perfectly correctly, and
thereafter it can be found with certainty by another organ of
touch.
We know by experience that children three months old are
very slow in learning to point their hands toward objects they
see, although they may know very well from the sensations of
touch how to direct them to the mouth or to an itching place on
the skin.  They have to make many trials before they learn to
understand the correspondence here between movement of eyes
and hands; and so also even in the case of grown people the
accuracy of this correspondence has to be continually regulated
by constantly repeated experiments and observations.
(Helmholtz, 1866/1925, pp. 246-247)
It is very difficult to imagine a contemporary physicist providing such an
analysis of the relation of vision to touch in connection with the location of
objects in space.  If psychology had not become a discipline independent of
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physics and biology as well as philosophy, those scholars specializing in
physical science would not expect data that contradicted quantum mechanics to
demonstrate a point within quantum mechanics, namely that the wave function
is a connection between cognition and the physical world.  For their part, those
scholars particularly knowledgeable about psychological phenomena also
would have been knowledgeable enough about physics not to have let this
position stand.  The significance of Helmholtz's early report on the effects of
altering incoming visual stimuli would not have been missed by physicists who
developed quantum mechanics, and the cognitive feature of the wave function
would have been recognized much sooner.
Bohr's Complementarity and Psychology
It should be pointed out that Bohr was one physicist who was familiar
with psychology, and it appears that his familiarity had the greatest of
consequences.  Of those physicists responsible for the development of quantum
mechanics, it was Bohr, who went the farthest in recognizing that
psychological phenomena were part and parcel of the quantum mechanical wave
function.  In the mid-1920's, Bohr came to understand that in quantum
mechanics, certain quantities (such as the position or momentum) of certain
physical existents (such as an electron) cannot both be known with arbitrary
precision.  He understood that in principle descriptions of these quantities are
mutually exclusive.  In that the mutually exclusive descriptions of these
quantities could both describe the existent and as these descriptions together
could simultaneously apply to the existent in pre-quantum physics, Bohr called
these descriptions complementary.  Bohr anchored complementarity to the
physical world because, for Bohr, the mutually exclusive descriptions were
determined by the concrete experimental arrangements that the physicist had
selected (e.g., one experimental arrangement to measure position and another
experimental arrangement to measure momentum of an electron) (Bohr, 1935).
It appears that Bohr was significantly influenced by the psychologist
William James in his development of the concept of complementarity, a central
concept in the theory of quantum mechanics.  Jammer (1966/1989) argued that
William James' work had a significant impact on Bohr's work in physics,
specifically in his development of complementarity.  Jammer wrote, "Bohr
repeatedly admitted how impressed he was particularly by the psychological
writings of this American philosopher" (p. 182).  Bohr was introduced to
James' work by Hffding, who is best known in psychology for the Hffding
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step (Hilgard & Bower, 1975).  It appears that Bohr was well-acquainted with
certain ideas discussed in James' The Principles of Psychology.
In discussing the origin of Bohr's concept of complementarity, Jammer
noted that it was probably James' use of the term in his discussion of work by
Janet and others on hysteria that had the major impact on Bohr.  In The
Principles of Psychology, James (1890/1983) wrote:
It must be admitted, therefore, that in certain persons [suffering
from hysteria], at least, the total possible consciousness may be
split into parts which coexist but mutually ignore each other, and
share the objects of knowledge between them.  More remarkable
still, they are complementary.  Give an object to one of the
consciousnesses, and by that fact you remove it from the other
or others. (p. 204)
Bohr seems to have suggested that complementarity itself might
fundamentally involve the fundamental structuring of perception, namely the
essential separation between that which is perceived and the perceiving person.
In this separation only a part of the world is thus accessible to the perceiving
person because this person of necessity has a particular stance in the world.
Bohr (1934/1961) wrote about the fundamental structure of perception:
For describing our mental activity [which includes perceptions
of the physical world], we require, on one hand, an objectively
given content to be placed in opposition to a perceiving subject,
while, on the other hand, as is already implied in such an
assertion, no sharp sensation between object and subject can be
maintained, since the perceiving subject also belongs to our
mental content.  From these circumstances follows...that a
complete elucidation of one and the same object may require
diverse points of view which defy a unique description. (p. 96)
It appears that the inescapable interaction between the measuring
apparatus and the physical entity measured that was at the heart of Bohr's
response to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen might indeed be subsumed in the
more fundamental structure of perception.  Once the significance of the
perceiving person to perception is acknowledged it is not very far to
acknowledging that "very different" (Einstein, 1949/1969, p. 85) wave
functions to which Einstein referred indicate the possibility of mutually
exclusive situations simultaneously characterizing the same concrete physical
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circumstance is indeed what a straightforward explanation of the quantum
mechanical wave function entails.
This object for the perceiving subject can of course be some
psychological phenomenon.  As noted, Bohr stated clearly that for physical
existents, it was the unavoidable interaction of the measuring instrument with
the existent measured that was the basis for complementary description.  It is
thus particularly interesting that in the quote immediately above, Bohr seemed
to indicate that complementarity may in its essence be an issue of the nature of
cognition, whether the phenomena considered are psychological or physical in
nature, and that the concrete experimental arrangement that Bohr emphasized in
physics may be subsumed in the more fundamental nature of cognition.
In addition, with a bit more attention to James' description of hysterics,
Bohr may well have recognized that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's
experiment really afforded the possibility of mutually exclusive situations
characterizing the same concrete physical circumstances.  In the above quote
from The Principles of Psychology, James (1890/1983) acknowledged that the
hysteric manifests "possible consciousnesses...[that nonetheless may]
"coexist....[even though you may] give an object to one of the
consciousnesses, and by that fact you remove it from the other or others" (p.
204).
CONCLUSION
An experiment has been proposed in this paper that applies
methodology from psychological research to an experiment in which an
experimental arrangement from physics is used.  Based on the results of
psychological research that relied on this methodology, it is likely that Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen's surprising theoretical result that mutually exclusive
quantum mechanical wave functions can simultaneously apply to the same
concrete physical circumstances can indeed be implemented on an empirical
level.  This conclusion lends support to the thesis that the quantum mechanical
wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world.
Among other factors, this thesis results from: 1) the quantum mechanical wave
function being the basis for whatever can be known concerning the physical
existent with which it is associated, 2) the knowledge derived using the wave
function is fundamentally probabilistic, and 3) the wave function in general
changes immediately throughout space upon measurement and, thus, so do the
probabilities that are dependent on it.
On the Quantum Mechanical
- 40 -
Using an article by Shimony, the approach of physicists to
understanding the quantum mechanical wave function is discussed, and the
historical basis for their approach has also been explored.  A comparison of
physicists' consideration of the quantum mechanical wave function was made
to the behaviorists' consideration of mind earlier in this century.  Of the
physicists responsible for the development of quantum mechanics, it was Bohr
who appears to have been the most familiar with psychology and who came the
closest to recognizing that psychological phenomena were part and parcel of the
quantum mechanical wave function.
There is one further note I would like to make.  This note concerns the
use of the Greek letter Y that is far and away the most common designation for
the wave function in quantum mechanics.  Y is also used by the American
Psychological Association as its logo.  The underlying meaning of its
designation as the logo for the American Psychological Association is readily
apparent to me, as is the etymological dependence of words related to the mind
in English, such as psychology and psychoanalysis, upon it.  The use of, and
dependence on, Y in these cases derives from the Greek mythological character
Psyche, who came to stand for the soul.  Thus, the use of the symbol in
psychology is not a mystery.
But the use of Y so prevalently in physics to represent the quantum
mechanical wave function, including its use by Schrdinger in his first papers
on wave mechanics (e.g., Schrdinger, 1926a/1928, 1926b/1928), is another
matter.  As has been discussed in this paper, early on major figures in the
development of the quantum mechanics (e.g., Bohr, Schrdinger, Einstein, and
Heisenberg) realized that the measurement process was central to the concept of
physical reality in quantum mechanics and recognized that a link between
cognition and the physical world was not an unnatural possibility in quantum
mechanics, even if they maintained that it was not in fact the case.
This realization does not seem to have eluded contemporary physicists
as well.  For example, Mermin (1985) quoted Greenberger, a physicist who
said, "Quantum mechanics is magic" (p. 38).  Or Feynman (1982) wrote:
We always have had (secret, secret, close the doors!) we always
have had a great deal of difficulty understanding the world view
that quantum mechanics represents.  At least I do, because I'm
an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is
obvious to me.  Okay, I still get nervous with it.  And therefore,
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some of the younger students...you know how it always is,
every new idea, it takes a generation or two until it becomes
obvious that there's no real [emphasis added] problem.  It has
not yet become obvious to me that there's no real [emphasis
added] problem.  I cannot define the real [emphasis added]
problem, therefore I suspect there's no real [emphasis added]
problem, but I'm note [sic] sure there's no real [emphasis
added] problem. (p. 471)
That Feynman (1982) cannot define the "real problem" (p. 471) and is "not sure
there's no real problem" (p. 471) is the case in part because physicists have
maintained a stance that does not allow for a straightforward explanation of the
quantum mechanical wave function.  Feynman's repeated use of the word
"real" signifies his acknowledgement that the primary issue of concern to him is
whether the physical world in quantum mechanics exists independently of the
individual who is thinking about it and observing it.
Some of the assumptions that have hidered a straightforward
explanation of the quantum mechanical wave function have been explored in
this paper, and an attempt has been made to begin the reintegration of
knowledge from psychology and physics.  This reintegration of knowledge has
provided the basis for an empirical demonstration that the quantum mechanical
wave function is a link between human cognition and the physical world.  
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